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Amnon Lev 
SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERALISM:  
INVENTING AND REINVENTING PUBLIC LAW 
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in 
general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful les-
sons. We may profit by their experience without having to 
pay the price which it cost them. 
John Jay, The Federalist Papers, V. 
he critique of sovereignty is a standard feature of federalism the-
ory which, more often than not, gets itself off the ground by en-
gaging with sovereignty’s claim that all power flows from a sin-
gle source, the perfect antithesis to its own claim that power is always dis-
tributed and shared between different agents in whom it inheres originally. 
For the most part, the critique of sovereignty consists in pointing out that 
power never actually inheres in a single locus, from which the untruth of 
sovereignty as a theory about how to organize political life is taken to fol-
low. The argument is nothing if not persuasive. It does, however, leave us to 
wonder how the idea of sovereignty, in spite of its being so obviously 
flawed, nevertheless managed to hold sway within public law theory for so 
long. More importantly, by focusing exclusively on whether sovereignty’s 
claim to be the source of all power is true, the critique evacuates the ques-
tion of whether sovereignty might condition federalism theory in other 
ways.  
Understanding the implication of federalism and sovereignty requires us 
to look beyond the logical incompatibility of sovereignty and federalism, 
which posits their implication as something static. Instead, we shall consider 
how this implication works itself out in certain canonical texts of political 
jurisprudence as a function of how theory reflects and enacts basic intuitions 
of political reality. We remain within the realm of theory. However, theory 
is no longer seen as inert propositions but as a form of action that responds 
to and in turn determines a context of social action. Seen in this perspective, 
federalism appears as a trajectory, growing out of a specific intersection of 
theory and history. We shall compare two such trajectories: federalism as it 
is articulated in European political jurisprudence and the political theory of 
the nascent American federation. We shall first consider how sovereignty 
laid out the domain of public law (I) into which federalism had to fit. We 
shall then analyse the strategies of federalization to which this ordering of 
public law theory gave rise (II). Moving across the Atlantic, we consider the 
work that notions of sovereignty and federalism did in the articulation of a 
public law theory for the republic that was being founded (III). As we shall 
see, this not only involved adapting elements of political jurisprudence to a 
T 
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new context of political action; it also involved coming to terms with the 
meanings with which they had been overlaid in other contexts (IV). 
I. SOVEREIGN POWER AND PUBLIC LAW THEORY  
The federalist critique of sovereignty almost invariably focuses on the 
work of Thomas Hobbes. He is taken to task for having buried the diversity 
of constitutional life under the uniform cloak of sovereign power. The re-
proach is undoubtedly justified but only rarely do his critics inquire why he 
did so. Rather than shut himself within a closed polity Hobbes could have 
chosen to focus on the supra-statal system of governance that was still in 
place in continental Europe at his time1. If he did not, it is because he was 
also, and perhaps primarily, concerned to establish the locus of droit poli-
tique, by which we mean a format of law that is immanent to the body poli-
tic and public in nature. Within the architectonic of Hobbes’ theory of 
commonwealth, the aspect of immanence, which engages the relationship of 
man to God, is the most important one. For our purposes, however, attention 
revolves around the public nature of law; the role popular sovereignty 
played in the creation of a public format of law. In taking all law back to a 
single source, sovereignty created a uniform domain of law in which dis-
tinctions between public and private had no place. In earlier political juris-
prudence, including the work of Bodin and Grotius, it is not entirely clear 
whether law was public or private, as reflected in the still-current idea of a 
patrimonial kingdom. In 1625, as Grotius publishes his inquiry into the 
rights of war and peace, the public laws or, failing that, the consent of the 
people, is identified as the source of constitutional authority. But Grotius 
acknowledges that, in some cases, the distribution of constitutional authority 
is made according to norms of a non-public nature: « For in Kingdoms not 
patrimonial, the Regency belongs to those, to whom the publick Laws, or 
upon their Deficiency, the Consent of the People shall consign it. But in 
Kingdoms Patrimonial, it belongs to those whom the Father, or nearest Kin-
dred shall chuse2 ».  
In Hobbes’ political philosophy, the indeterminacy has been lifted. The 
distinction between the office and the person of the sovereign no longer 
needs to be proved; it is simply a fact. As the student of the common laws 
tells the philosopher in Hobbes’ dialogue on the common laws, the king is, 
in a sense, more than one: « all Soveraigns are said to have a double Capaci-
ty; viz. a natural Capacity, as he is Man, and a politick Capacity, as a 
 
1  R. LESAFFER, « Peace Treaties in the Formation of International Law », in 
B. FASSBENDER & A. PETERS (dir.), Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 86; A. OSIANDER, « Sovereignty, International 
Relations, and the Westphalian Myth », International Organization, 55, 2011, p. 264-266, 
269. 
2 H. GROTIUS, The Rights of War and Peace, I, III, XV, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 2005, 
p. 297-298. See also J. BODIN, Les Six Livres de la République, I, VIII, Paris, Librairie Ar-
thème, Fayard, 1986, p. 225-226. 
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King3 ». This is, in outline, the idea of public law, the notion that all forms 
of title and all forms of property derive from the same source: the laws of 
the commonwealth in which the will of the sovereign is expressed. On the 
strength of this idea, Hobbes can dismiss other, traditional titles to authority. 
Titles of nobility, for example, « in old time titles of office and command », 
have « by occasion of trouble and for reasons of good and peaceable gov-
ernment » been turned into « mere titles, serving for the most part to distin-
guish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the commonwealth4 ». 
For some time now, we are told, men have been made « counts, marquises, 
and barons of places wherein they had neither possession nor command ». 
Hobbes’ reduction of authority to a public format of law involves a dual 
operation: he redefines the origin of authority so as to bring it back to a sin-
gle source, at the same time as he introduces a state of radical uncertainty, 
the state of nature. The re-definition of the origin of authority brings togeth-
er all constitutional actors by dissolving the differences that medieval law-
yers had established between them, leaving only a mass of identical individ-
uals with no principle to order their sociality. This is the backdrop to 
Hobbes’ laconic commitment to the principle of popular sovereignty, posit-
ed as a condition of political life. Sovereignty is popular sovereignty be-
cause civil order arises out of the coming together of the individuals that 
make up the people: « When men have met to erect a commonwealth, they 
are, almost by the very fact that they have met, a Democracy5 ». 
The prominence of the demos is unprecedented in the history of political 
theory. Where the people was formerly seen simply as a constitutional actor 
amongst others, it is now the element out of which civil order is fashioned. 
Most likely, the reservation expressed in the « almost » that Hobbes adds re-
flects a sense of unease about designating the people as the sole source of 
power. It might also, however, reflect an awareness on his part that in apply-
ing the well-established legal concept of the demos to what would still have 
been seen as a ragtag assembly of constitutional actors, he was committing a 
category mistake.  
To this operation, which has the effect of bringing all parts of the medi-
eval constitution together, is joined another which has received far more at-
tention: the introduction of a state of nature. The radical uncertainty of life 
in the state of nature acts as a solvent of all pre-existing ties between indi-
 
3 T. HOBBES, A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of 
England, Chicago/London, University of Chicago Press, 1971, p. 160 (hereinafter Dialogue 
of Common Laws). The dimension of the private is not fully expunged from constitutional 
order. It remains in the form of the duality of the king’s two bodies: « Whatsoever a Mon-
arch does Command, or do by consent of the People of his Kingdom, may properly be said 
to be done in his politick Capacity; and whatsoever he Commands by Word of Mouth only, 
or by Letters Signed with his hand, or Sealed with any of his private Seals done in his natu-
ral Capacity: Nevertheless, his publick Commands, have their original from his natural Ca-
pacity. For in the making of Laws (which necessarily requires his assent) his assent is natu-
ral[.] » (p. 162).  
4 Id., Leviathan, I, X, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1994, p. 52, p. 56-57.  
5 Id., On the Citizen, VII, 5, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 239 (94). 
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viduals and is thus an enabling condition of the creation of a single source 
of authority. For this creation to succeed, it cannot rely on already-
constituted constitutional categories as they refer back to earlier, traditional 
distributions of power6. It must be a creatio ex nihilo in that it must be 
wholly contained within the moment (even if it is not wholly immanent as 
political subjection leaves intact man’s relationship to God).  
The mechanism that allows Hobbes to contain the alienation of liberty 
within the moment of genesis is authorization. Each man covenants with 
every other man to subject his will to the will of the sovereign and make 
himself the author of his every act, provided that all others do the same. The 
novelty of Hobbes’ conception is that he ties the subject’s alienation of lib-
erty to his integration into the people, in contrast to the medieval forms of 
authorization which revolved around the notion of a transfer between self-
standing equals. Authorization, to Hobbes, marks the « generation of the 
great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God to 
which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and defence ». As the act 
of creation is wholly contained within the moment, its elements – the sub-
jects, the sovereign, and the people – are kept in a state of continuous impli-
cation. Paradoxically, this is what allows Hobbes to detach the exercise of 
sovereign power from the will of its constituent parts. In this triadic struc-
ture where every part makes reference to every other, only the sovereign is 
manifestly present. As the body politic is constituted in and through its au-
thorization by the subjects, its capacity for action, indeed its very existence 
as a discrete entity, is tied to the person of the sovereign. Absent subjection, 
which is the only thing keeping the subjects together, they are nothing but a 
multitude: « A multitude of men are made one person, when they are by one 
man, or one person, represented so that it be done with the consent of every 
one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representer, not 
the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one7 ». 
The inaugural gesture of modern public law theory, the end towards 
which the invention of sovereignty tends, relies on stripping the people of its 
political agency so as to maintain the purity of the will of the popular sover-
eign. In other words, the public nature of law is predicated on the self-
effacing of the very subject whose (collective) will is the source of law. The 
volition of the people exhausts itself in the act whereby it wills itself into 
being. Its genesis coincides with its eclipse as a political agent which means 
 
6 Id., Dialogue of the Common Laws, op. cit., p. 96: « Now as to the Authority you ascribe 
to Custome, I deny that any Custome of its own Nature, can amount to the Authority of 
Law: For if the Custom be unreasonable, you must with all other Lawyers confess that it is 
no Law, but ought to be abolished; and if the Custom be reasonable, it is not the Custom, 
but the Equity [and hence the implicit jurisdiction of the King] that makes it Law ». The 
problem resurfaces in the inconclusive attempt by Hegel to offer a speculative justification 
of the centrality of the prince in the constitution (see G.W.F. HEGEL, Principles of the Phi-
losophy of Right, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, § 280, p. 321. On this 
point, see the analysis in A. LEV, Sovereignty and Liberty: A Study of the Foundations of 
Power, Abingdon, Routledge, 2014, p. 137-140.  
7 T. HOBBES, Leviathan, I, XVI, 3, op. cit., p. 104. 
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that the people is never properly present within constitutional order but only 
intersects with it.  
On this conception of the role of the popular sovereign, there is no room 
to consider how power is to be distributed, which is to say that there is no 
room for a theory of federalism. In enjoining the people to will itself as 
more-than-one, federalism renders inoperative a will that depends for its op-
eration on having no content other than its own unity. Even prior to the en-
counter with sovereign power, the imperative of constructing a sphere of 
public law banishes from view all federal phenomena, not by opposition to 
federalism but more fundamentally, because this format of public law theory 
gets in the way of understanding what federalism is about. Given the work 
sovereignty, and with it public law theory, is called to do, federalism ap-
pears as a performative self-contradiction.  
A thorough survey of the literature would be required to show how this 
incomprehension conditions the attempts by public law theorists to articu-
late the federation. The following section will point to elements of a re-
sponse but for our purposes, one reference will have to suffice to demon-
strate the persistence of this incomprehension into the twentieth century: 
Carl Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory. The interest of Schmitt’s work is that 
he realizes the inadequacy of the conceptual framework within which the 
federation had been analysed and, in an attempt to capture its specificity, 
tries to carve out a middle ground between the confederation and federal 
state. But in taking the being of the federation back to an act of the popular 
sovereign, he ends up taking on the schemata of modern public law theory. 
Thus, he tells us that to constitute itself as a federal commonwealth, a peo-
ple must will itself as a federal people and this presupposes that the duality 
of a federation is capable of being assumed by the people. Duality must be 
real which is to say that the sense of non-unity must be real. At the same 
time, the sense of non-unity cannot introduce real tension into the federal 
polity as this would cause the polity to break apart. This indeterminacy of 
tension – real, yet never so real as to put into question the unity of the polity 
– has the effect of suspending the decision about the existence of an existen-
tial community which, to Schmitt, is the defining characteristic of the politi-
cal. Within the Bund, the question of sovereignty must « always remain 
open, » which, on the terms of his theory, means that a federation can never 
be the locus of political life. Crucially, it also means something else that 
Schmitt does not acknowledge but which follows from the terms of his theo-
ry. The supposition that the question of sovereignty must always remain 
open in a federation, in other words, that it does not admit of a decision, 
means that, whatever its prominence in Schmitt’s theory, the federation 
cannot be the locus of ultimate meanings and is therefore not a real object of 
public law theory8. 
 
8 C. SCHMITT, Constitutional Theory, 7, III, 1, c, Durham, Duke University Press, 2008, 
§ 29, p. 390. Schmitt predicates the existence of the union on the homogeneity of its mem-
bers (see § 2, c), p. 395) which, on the terms of his theory, is tantamount to saying that the 
Empire is a federation in name only. For a different view, see Ch. SCHÖNBERGER, « Die 
Europäische Union als Bund. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Verabschiedung des Staatenbund-
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II. STRATEGIES OF FEDERALISM: CONFEDERATION AND FEDERAL STATE 
To understand the implication of federalism and sovereignty in Europe-
an public law theory, we must keep in mind the paramount importance, for 
public law theory, of establishing a locus from which social life could be 
ordered by reference to norms of a public nature. As we have seen, this im-
perative precluded even raising the question of how power should be dis-
tributed between constitutional actors. As a result, the federal idea always 
arrived too late to have an impact on the constitution of the polity. Finding 
the polity to be already constituted on a unitary format, publicist either rele-
gated federalism to the interstate sphere, a reflection of, and subservient to, 
the will of the states, or they sought to integrate it wholly into the polity in 
the form of a federal state. The first of these strategies we see exemplified in 
the work of Montesquieu; the second in German public law theory at a time 
when publicists tried to come to terms with the new reality of the empire9.  
Federalism, as articulated by Montesquieu, is a means whereby small 
republics can remedy the military weakness that attends on their size, with-
out falling prey to the internal vice that, in a large state, will invariably 
cause republican rule to degenerate into despotism10. If federalism is a com-
promise, the accommodation of a reality that one would have wanted other-
wise, it is a felicitous compromise. It lets a small republic have the best of 
both worlds: « Composed of small republics, [the confederation] enjoys the 
goodness of the internal government of each one; and, with regard to the ex-
terior, it has, by the force of the association, all the advantages of large 
monarchies11 ». 
The finality of confederalism is perhaps best put in evidence if we con-
sider the ill-effects of its absence. If republics are left to fend for them-
selves, Montesquieu is concerned that military power will contaminate the 
political nature of their internal government. Having been unshackled from 
the chains of law for the purpose of preserving the commonwealth against 
external threats, power tends to liberate itself from law altogether. It is a 
concern that Montesquieu shares with Rousseau. Rousseau’s comments to 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s federalist project clearly express an appreciation of 
the danger that the power a society has concentrated at its borders to keep it 
safe will, in time, extend its dominion inwards. It is « easy to see that war 
                                                                                                                            
Bundesstaat-Schemas », Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 129, 2004, p. 99-100. Schönberger 
notes, however, that Schmitt’s consideration of sovereignty in the Bund may not accord 
with his general theory of sovereignty (p. 105, n. 91) which is precisely the source of the 
tension we have pointed to.  
9 The belief that federations would need to be federal states survived well into the twentieth 
century. See, for example, R. CARRÉ DE MALBERG, Contribution à la Théorie Générale de 
l’État, Paris, Librairie de la Société du Recuil Siery, 1920, I, p. 92 where the distinction 
confederation-federal state is presented as self-evident. 
10 C.L. MONTESQUIEU, The Spirit of the Laws, II, IX, 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989, p. 131. 
11 Ibid., p. 132.  
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and conquest, on the one hand, and the advance of despotism, on the other 
hand, strengthen one another12 ». 
On this view, federalism is not a political or even a constitutional prin-
ciple. At most, it is a sort of safeguard against the spread of domination but 
really it is a tool of governance (which is precisely the view of federalism 
Hamilton pushes back against in Federalist No. 9)13. Another, theoretically 
more interesting, option is that of superimposing a unitary format of state on 
the federation, as practised by German publicists of the nineteenth century. 
Taking Georg Jellinek, the most brilliant among them, as our example, we 
find that what moves him to consider federalism is the implication of sover-
eignty and public law methodology we have pointed to. His primary con-
cern is to place the new German Federation within a topology of legal forms 
of interstate relations. The federation attracts his attention because it desta-
bilizes the framework that keeps in place public law theory. The inherent in-
stability of the federation, due to the implication of its inner and outer di-
mensions, undercuts the attempt to maintain a distinction between the legal 
regimes that governs them: the law of the land and the law of nations. This 
prompts Jellinek to warn that if we cannot assign lines of demarcation to the 
concepts of state law and international law as clear as those found between 
the concepts of private law, we cannot consider either discipline as a sci-
ence14.  
As Jellinek looks to find a place for the federation in public law theory, 
he falls back on the notion of sovereignty. Unconditional power is the only 
criterion that will qualify the federation as a full-fledged public law form. 
Only at the point where power becomes unconditional – sovereign – does it 
detach itself from those that brought it into being. Sovereignty can therefore 
serve as a warrant of the federation’s public law credentials. Jellinek’s reli-
ance on sovereignty is noteworthy as it conspicuously absent both from his 
general theory of state and his work on international law, the two spheres 
that the federation straddles15. In fact, it is all the more noteworthy as Jellin-
 
12 J.-J. ROUSSEAU, Extrait de projet de paix perpétuelle et jugement, in Id., Œuvres Com-
plètes, III : Du Contrat Social. Écrits Politiques, Paris, Éditions Gallimard, 1964, p. 593.  
13 See the analysis in V. OSTROM, « The Meaning of Federalism in The Federalist: A Criti-
cal Examination of the Diamond Theses », Publius, 15, 1, 1985, p. 9-11.  
14 G. JELLINEK, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen, Wien, Alfred Hölder, 1882, p. 15. 
15  The significance that the format of sovereignty, and the relationship of domination 
around which it revolves, comes to have in Jellinek’s theory of federation contrasts with his 
analyses of the spheres of law that lie on either side of it. In his earlier construction of the 
interstate sphere and in his later theory of state, state power is formalized as a relationship 
of the state, or the state apparatus, to itself, stripping it off any existential-political dimen-
sion (see Id., Die rechtliche Natur der Staatenverträge, Wien, Alfred Hölder, 1880, p. 15-
18, 43-45 where the binding nature of treaty law is deduced from the formal presupposi-
tions of an act of volition; see Id., Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin, Verlag von O. Häring, 
1900, p. 420, 445 where he denies that sovereignty constitutes an essential characteristic of 
state authority; see A. BÖHMER, Die Europäische Union im Lichte der Reichsverfassung 
von 1871. Vom dualistischen zum transnationalen Föderalismus, Berlin, Duncker & 
Humblot, 1999, p. 109-110; J. KERSTEN, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre, 
Tübingen, J.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 2000), p. 297-298.  
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ek, even as he introduces the idea of sovereign power, dismisses the mecha-
nism by which Hobbes first brought it into being. A federation cannot have 
its foundation in contract any more than any other form of polity because 
power to command cannot rest on assent: 
One cannot, by means of a contract, bring forth a higher will to sit above 
or an independent will to sit next to one. […] A public authority that had 
come about in this way would not have the most prominent characteristic 
of a state power: it could not rule or command unconditionally, but would 
at all times depend on the good will of the members of society16.  
The repudiation of social contract theory, and with it the idea of repre-
sentation through authorization, leaves Jellinek without the conventional 
means of showing how federal power connects to its subjects, which in turn 
leaves unexplained how a federation could ever compel by command. It is 
to address this question that Jellinek turns to American federalism. The 
point of his very selective appropriation of it is to show that a people can be 
a federal people without having made itself so. Federalism need not, in oth-
er words, involve agency on the part of the popular sovereign.  
What acts in the constitution of a federation, Jellinek tells us, is history, 
not the people. In the first instance, the pre-eminence of history is epistemo-
logical. Only by consulting history can we find out if a sense of belonging to 
a destinal community has built up so as to elevate the federal entity to the 
status of a federal state, the fulfillment of the national aspirations of a peo-
ple17. It might seem curious that Jellinek should choose the political history 
of the United States of America, not that of Germany, as the medium of his 
demonstration. Notwithstanding the paradigmatic status that American fed-
eralism had already come to enjoy, we would not expect him to look to it for 
lessons about how to understand the new constitutional reality of federal 
Germany. As he notes, deep-seated differences in the social and historical 
underpinnings of constitutional order militate against transposing theories of 
American federalism onto the German empire. Such theories are appropriate 
for a federal state founded on the sovereignty of the people and the autono-
my of its member states, each of which were given sovereignty as « a gift at 
birth »; they are not appropriate for an empire of predominantly monarchic 
states whose princes have for centuries been the subjects of a common mas-
ter18. 
But what Jellinek wants to show is exactly that even in the United States 
of America where federalism is supposedly just another expression for pop-
ular sovereignty, what called the federation into being are in fact forces that 
transcend the actions of the popular sovereign. The demonstration, if one 
 
16 G. JELLINEK, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen, op. cit., p. 257-258.  
17 Ibid., p. 257. 
18 Ibid, p. 188. This sense of the inadequacy of what we might call traditional federalism for 
Germany is already articulated in Johann Caspar Bluntschli’s comments to the Paulskirche 
Constitution, see J.C. BLUNTSCHLI, Bemerkungen über die neuesten Vorschläge zur 
deutschen Verfassung, München, Christian Kaiser, 1848, p. 11, where Bluntschli predicts 
that the union of states proposed by the Frankfurt Assembly will prove to be a transitional 
form on the way to a monarchic empire. 
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can call it that, moves between constitutional law and political history, using 
the latter to determine the truth of the former. On grounds that are never 
made clear, Jellinek uses John C. Calhoun’s dilemma, the point of which is 
to tie federalism to popular sovereignty, as a stand-in for contractualism19. 
Jellinek is not concerned to refute this dilemma that shows the impossibility, 
in theory, of a federal state; his point is that the dilemma does not even 
arise. When he tells us that « [one] thing we can take from Calhoun’s work, 
a result by now firmly established, is that a federal state cannot be founded 
on contract, » he is not telling us anything about Calhoun’s work but about 
the fate it suffered as the constitutional policy of the Southern Confederacy. 
The defeat of the South established the value we should put on Calhoun’s 
theorem: « History decided that it did not apply to the Union20 ». 
The implication is that the constitutional nature of a state, whether it is 
federal or unitary, is not the result of a determination through political agen-
cy simply because there is no political agency at the level of the constitu-
tion. The popular sovereign was not the actual agent of the determination 
that took place on the battlefield, and the moment the popular sovereign did 
act – the moment of the conclusion of the (federal) social contract – is not 
the moment in which the federation was made: « Where a contract has been 
concluded by the future members of a federal state, it should not be consid-
ered as the rightful foundation of the new construct21 ». The absence of po-
litical agency is mirrored by the non-political nature of the sentiments that 
the new federal constructs elicits from its subjects. These are sentiments of 
an intensely personal nature that cannot easily be recovered politically. A 
need to join with others to survive combined with a « heightened religious 
sentiment » impelled « a handful of people » to leave behind the « frightful 
solitude » in which they found themselves in order to found a polity22 . 
Working from the idea of a pre-political foundation of the polity, Jellinek 
forces a convergence between the trajectories of the American and the Ger-
man federation. So powerful is the determination of constitutional order 
through history that it obliterates the differences between states constituted 
in and through acts of the people and states that have come about through 
constitutional change imposed from above. In both instances, an old order is 
 
19 See J.C. CALHOUN, Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States 
of America, in R.K CRALLE (dir.), John C. Calhoun. The Works [1848-1849], New York, 
D. Appleton & Company, 1854, vol. I, p. 145-147. For an analysis, see O. BEAUD, Théorie 
de la Fédération, Paris, PUF, 2009, p. 43-47. As Olivier Beaud notes, Jellinek’s appropria-
tion of American constitutional doctrine is biased in favour of the nationalist position 
whose theorists constitute his primary points of reference (see O. BEAUD, « La notion de 
pacte fédératif. Contribution à une théorie constitutionnelle de la Fédération », in 
J.F. KERVÉGAN & M. HEINZ (dir.), Gesellschaftliche Freiheit und vertragliche Bindung in 
Rechtsgeschichte und Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1999, p. 236, 
n. 125). 
20 G. JELLINEK, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen, op. cit., p. 194.  
21 Ibid., p. 189.  
22 Ibid., p. 262. See the critique in H. KELSEN, Das Problem der Souveränität und Theorie 
des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer reinen Rechtslehre, Scientia Verlag, 1981, p. 284, n. 1, 
see p. 281, n. 1. 
Sovereignty and Federalism – A. Lev 
 
 
200 
swept aside to make room for « something radically new, something that 
was not there before23 ». 
Collapsing the distinction between states whose political history re-
volves around popular agency and states where the people is only ever the 
object of action, never the agent, is not quite a demonstration that a federal 
state is a national enterprise. What it does is to cancel out a set of intuitions 
that would make us disinclined to posit the federal state as a national enter-
prise. Given, on the one hand, that a state cannot come into being by means 
of a contract and, on the other hand, that its self-affirmation as a nation-state 
can take place in and through executive action, there is no a priori reason 
why we should suppose that a federal constitution would lack an existential 
foundation. On the contrary, the implication of the argument Jellinek makes 
is that for a federal state to have any historical reality, it cannot be found 
wanting in that regard; it must be an object of strong existential commit-
ment. To exist at all, it must exist in full24.  
On both outcomes of the strategies of federalism we have considered – 
confederation and federal state –, the question of political life is evacuated. 
The system of confederal governance outlined by Montesquieu involves the 
reduction of social life to survival and prosperity, the goods of the state of 
nature and of market society, leaving no space to articulate a political com-
munity. The federal state, for its part, is led to bracket the question of politi-
cal life so as to appropriate the mysterious fact of federalism of which it 
cannot make sense because the being of a state consists in the act of willing 
itself and it cannot will itself to be anything but one. To negotiate this apor-
ia, Jellinek had to, on the one hand, sever the link that tied public law theory 
to the idea of sovereign will, which meant leaving the determination of the 
federation to history, and, on the other hand, engage an intense spiritualiza-
tion of the new federal construct so as to show that despite not being a crea-
tion of its subject, it could still elicit a sense of existential commitment from 
them. Integrating the federation completely, doing away with its indetermi-
nacy, thus comes at the price of abandoning the project of political jurispru-
dence; the ambition of showing the state to be a political community. In the 
federal state, the indeterminacy that attaches to federalism is neutralized. 
 
23 G. JELLINEK, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen, op. cit., p. 280-281, see p. 268. 
24 This operation in which the federation is aligned on the people and, in turn, on the form 
of the state recurs in the work of Heinrich Triepel for whom the basis of a federation is to 
be found in its « federative foundations » which perpetuate the « spirit » of its founding 
treaty (see H. TRIEPEL, Unitarismus und Föderalismus im Deutschen Reiche. Eine staats-
rechliche und politische Studie, Tübingen, Verlag von J.C.B., 1907, p. 29). The federal de-
termination of the polity remains past in the sense that it does not require a renewed com-
mitment in order to be valid. Consequently, Triepel cannot show how a federation can elicit 
the commitment of individuals who were not directly implicated in the decision to federate. 
In the end, he concludes from the presumed fact of federation to the existence of its ena-
bling condition: « There must be some element of popular will in this if the people is to de-
velop, from the outset, this sense of commitment towards the legal will without which no 
legal order has the power to compel. Thus, the constitution [of a federation] does not rest 
exclusively on a “federative” but also, if I may say so, on a “constitutional” foundation [...] 
In other words, the statal “foundation” is in every respect a match for the federative » 
(p. 31).  
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However, as a state, the federal state can no longer generate commitment by 
holding out the promise of political liberty. To sustain itself, it must tap into 
non-political sources of commitment.  
The oscillation between the two prongs of this alternative results from 
the pre-eminent role of sovereignty in European political jurisprudence. 
Seen in this perspective, it is understandable that many believe that the ob-
stacles to the emergence of a truly federal Europe could be cleared if only 
we could lay to rest the ghost of sovereignty25. On the analysis of Jellinek’s 
theory of federalism we propose, we have cause to doubt this belief. The 
emergence, or re-emergence, of sovereignty is not reflective of an excessive 
attachment to it. The attempt to elevate the federal entity to a federal state is 
driven by other considerations, chief among them a fear that predates and 
has outlived sovereignty, the fear that the people might return to claim the 
power it had relinquished. This would bring about the implosion of the 
world of public law, in theory and in fact26.  
III. THE SECOND SAILING: FEDERALISM, POPULAR WILL, AND TERRITORY 
If the notion of sovereignty is used only sparingly in the federalist pa-
pers, the source and subject of sovereign power – the people – makes its 
presence felt throughout. Its consent is the « pure, original fountain of all le-
gitimate authority, » and the « precious blood » that was spilt in making the 
American Revolution is that of the « people of America27 ». We are a far cry 
from the world of Hobbes’ Leviathan which, if it also reflects dramatic po-
litical events – the English Civil War that forced him into a decade-long ex-
ile in Paris – does so only at a distance. It is natural to suppose that the sense 
of the immediate presence of the people that pervades the federalist papers 
reflects the liberty that a people had claimed and won. This would commit 
us to seeing history as the dominant element in the intersection of theory 
and history that is federalism. We should, however, be wary of supposing 
that the differences between European and American political jurisprudence 
can be accounted for solely in terms of the proximity of theory to historico-
 
25 M. BURGESS, Federalism and European Union. The Building of Europe 1950-2000, Ab-
ingdon, Routledge, 2000, p. 12-13; D.J. ELAZAR, « The United States and Europe: Models 
for Their Epochs », in K. NICOLAIDIS & R. HOWSE (dir.), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy 
and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, p. 34; M. FORSYTH, Union of States: The Theory and Practice of 
Confederation, New York, Leicester University Press, 1981, p. 79-80; C.J. FRIEDRICH, 
Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, London, Pall Mall Press, 1968, p. 12-13; 
N. MACCORMICK, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Com-
monwealth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 126-132; R. SCHÜTZE, From Dual to 
Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009, p. 30. 
26 See also the remarks concerning social contract theory in Jellinek’s theory of state where 
he tells us that from being foundational of the state, social contract theory acts as a solvent 
of it (G. JELLINEK, Allgemeine Staatslehre, op. cit., p. 192).  
27 The Federalist Papers, London, Penguin Books, 1987, XXII, p. 184 (Hamilton); XLV, 
p. 293 (Madison). 
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political action. Theory also has a history which, while it does not unfold in 
isolation from political history, cannot be reduced to it either. In order to 
understand the differences between federalisms, we also have to assess how, 
and how far, theory has moved between their points of inception.  
It is not the capacity for political action, or lack of same, that explains 
why the people’s presence in the primordial assembly leaves such an im-
print on Hobbes’ work that its absence from government cannot be anything 
but a source of embarrassment. So much so in fact that Hobbes feels called 
to add that it is the people itself that assembles again, having grown tired of 
attending the public courts, « dwelling far off » as they do, to institute a re-
stricted form of government so that the burden of exercising the power of 
which they are the source may be taken from them28. Equally, it is not polit-
ical action but a process of sedimentation/acculturation that explains the 
ease with which Madison and Hamilton move between committing to popu-
lar sovereignty and excluding the people from government29. If Madison can 
proclaim it as the novelty of the American form of government that the peo-
ple « in their collective capacity » be excluded from it30, it is paradoxically 
because the semantic nexus that ties civil authority to the body politic is 
now so firmly entrenched that its presence within constitutional order need 
not be invoked at every turn.  
The strong presence of the popular sovereign within constitutional order 
has several important consequences. It means, for one, that the people need 
not be assigned a specific constitutional locus, in contrast to European pub-
lic law theory where parliament was the conduit through which the people 
would establish a presence within constitutional order31. In America, each 
branch of government is seen as an emanation of the people and can claim 
 
28 T. HOBBES, Elements of Law Natural & Politic, II, 2, 6, London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 
1969, p. 121. Hobbes’ reference to public courts that are situated far away from the dwell-
ings of the common people is, to my knowledge, without equivalent in his work. The refer-
ence is likely to Aristotle’s Politics where the same reason is given to explain the transition 
from an initial, unlimited state of government to a more restricted form of government (see 
Aristotle, Politics, VI, 4, 1318b11-20).  
29 Akhil Reed Amar argues persuasively that the system of government that would come 
out of the American Revolution was prefigured in the charters of the corporations as which 
several of the states had originally been designed (see A. REED AMAR, «Of Sovereignty and 
Federalism», Yale Law Journal, 96, 7, 1987, p. 1432-1437). This reading has the merit of 
situating the idea of an intersection of theory and history in a specific practice. However, 
analogizing between a corporate charter and a constitution and, more fundamentally, be-
tween a corporation and a commonwealth, not only engages but also presupposes a re-
definition of sovereignty. It presupposes that the presence of the people be so firmly en-
trenched in history that the difference between the nature of its acts (private/public) seem 
irrelevant when held up against the identity of the actor. 
30 The Federalist Papers, LXIII, p. 373 (Madison). 
31 For a brilliant analysis of the lack of a parliamentary tradition in German theory of state, 
see Ch. SCHÖNBERGER, Das Parliament im Anstaltsstaat. Zur Theorie parlamentarischer 
Repräsentation in der Staatsrechtslehre des Kaiserreichs (1871-1918) Frankfurt am Main, 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1997, passim, especially p. 282-300. 
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to speak in its name32. So firmly entrenched is the constitutional presence of 
the popular sovereign that its reach extends beyond the branches of federal 
government to all the parts of the Union. Depending on context, Madison 
can thus invoke the people to show the common origin of state and federal 
government and to disqualify the claims of the former to be sovereign in 
their own right33.  
A further, essential consequence follows from the strong presence of the 
popular sovereign within constitutional order. In Hobbes’ format of sover-
eignty, theory is tied to territory but indistinctly so. It is essential that theory 
be situated in space. This is what allows Hobbes to dismiss the claim that 
political power has a transcendent foundation. However, the position that 
theory occupies is underdetermined 34 . Sovereignty is always articulated 
from somewhere, but that somewhere could be anywhere. The authors of 
The Federalist Papers, for their part, articulate their theory of government 
from a determinate position in space. To this end, they rely on the existence 
of a given exterior. Their papers abound in references to Europe, seen either 
as a threat to the Union, directly through intervention or indirectly through 
instigation, or held up as an exemplar of what the Union would develop in-
to, should it ever become disunited. A disunited America would soon, Ham-
ilton warns, find itself in the situation of the continental powers of Europe 
whose liberties have fallen prey to the means of protecting themselves 
against each other’s jealousy and ambition:  
This is an idea not superficial nor futile, but solid and weighty. It de-
serves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and 
honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn 
pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this interesting 
idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and trace it to all its 
consequences, they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a 
Constitution, the rejection of which would in all probability put a final 
period to the Union. The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered 
imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place to the 
more substantial prospects of dangers, real, certain, and formidable35. 
 
32 For an analysis, see A. GIBSON, «Impartial Representation and the Extended Republic: 
Towards a Comprehensive and Balanced Reading of The Tenth Federalist Paper» History 
of Political Thought, 12-2, 1991, p. 299. 
33 The Federalist Papers, XLVI, p. 297; see XLV, p. 293. See J. MILLER, «The Ghostly 
Body Politic: The Federalist Papers and Popular Sovereignty», Political Theory, 16-1, 
1988, p. 104. The equivocation between the people of American and the peoples of the sov-
ereign states, and the conflict between nationalists and states rightists to which it shall later 
give rise, only refers back to and confirms the strength of the principle of popular sover-
eignty. 
34 Considering the papal claim that all Christian men make up one commonwealth under 
spiritual rule, Hobbes notes that it contains a « gross error […] [inasmuch as] it is evident 
that France is a commonwealth, Spain another, and Venice a third &c. And these consist of 
Christians » (T. HOBBES, Leviathan, III, XLII, 124, op. cit., p. 393). 
35  The Federalist Papers, VIII, p. 117-118 (Hamilton). On this point, see also XLIX, 
p. 314: « We are to recollect that all the existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a 
danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and concord ... The future 
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The existence of an immediate threat to the survival of the polity has the 
effect of suspending the question of the political identity of the people(s) 
that make it up. Hamilton and Madison need not require that the states 
abandon their separate identities. On the contrary, they constantly reaffirm 
that the natural inclination of the American people is to favour their local 
government over that of the Union, affection being a function of proximi-
ty36. What comes to if not take over from then at least supplement the identi-
ty of the federal people is the identity of the territory it inhabits. It is tempt-
ing to dismiss John Jay’s effusive description of America in The Federalist 
Papers No. 2 as gloss, but as an indication of how territory conditions polit-
ical jurisprudence, its significance can hardly be overestimated. Jay’s con-
tribution is predicated on a nexus of theory and territory where the emphasis 
is not on the dimension of the particular, as in European political jurispru-
dence, but on the particulars that make up a territory. The sense that the 
country of America and its people were made for each other means that the 
« variety » of its « soils and productions » and the « succession » of its 
« navigable waters » and « noble rivers » can serve as placeholders of the 
unity of civil order, unlike European political jurisprudence where the unity 
of civil order rest exclusively on the unity of the people, perfect only in the 
moment of its constitution. This is why the constitutional principle of Amer-
ican government can be cast as a spatial modification and why it can be left 
undetermined whether the « ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT » of which Hamil-
ton speaks concerns the dimensions of a single state or the consolidation of 
several states into one great confederacy.  
Consolidating the states into a confederacy would, of course, engage the 
question of the nature of the body politic and, with it, the question of the po-
litical identity of the popular sovereign. But what is at stake in the text is not 
the constitution of a body politic; it is the appropriation of territories that are 
not « detached and distant, but […] one connected, fertile, widespreading 
country ».The introduction of territory as a supplement to the body politic 
enables the transformation of the either/or of sovereignty into an inclusive 
ordering of divergent distributions of power, a compound regime. The unity 
of the territory of the American republic is proof positive that different lev-
els of government can co-exist within the same polity.  
Scholars have noted the tension between the system of federalism de-
veloped in Madison’s contributions and the emphasis on the need for a uni-
                                                                                                                            
situations in which we must expect to be usually placed do not present any equivalent secu-
rity against the danger which is apprehended » (Madison). 
36 The Federalist Papers, XVII, p. 157 (Hamilton), see XXV, p. 193 (Hamilton). This nex-
us is taken up by Tocqueville: « The sovereignty of the Union is an abstract being that is at-
tached to only a few external objects. The sovereignty of the states comes before all the 
senses; one comprehends it without difficulty; one sees it act at each instant. One is new; 
the other was born with the people itself. The sovereignty of the Union is the work of art. 
The sovereignty of the states is natural; it exists by itself without effort, like the authority of 
the father of a family. […] The sovereignty of the states depends on memories, on habit, on 
local prejudices, on the selfishness of province and family; in a word, on all the things that 
render the instinct for one’s native country so powerful in the heart of man. How could one 
doubt its advantages? » (A. TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America, I, I, 8, Chicago, Chica-
go University Press, 2002, p. 157-158).  
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tary government to conduct the foreign policy of the Union we find in those 
of Hamilton, one of the grounds on which the commitment of both to feder-
alism has been called into question37. This might be to take too narrow a 
view of federalism. Instead, we should consider, first, how the federalism of 
Madison’s and the imperialism of Hamilton, to use a terminology that has 
become standard, are implicated and, second, how internal power-sharing 
and external consolidation condition each other:  
1) Seen in the context of America’s history, the consolidation of gov-
ernment in matters of foreign policy involves more than a concession to the 
pragmatic requirements of international life. At the semantic level, federal-
ism and foreign policy are implicated. What constitutes the appropriation, in 
fact and in law, of territory as a collective enterprise is an implicit reference 
to the act by which the « people » of America cast off colonial rule, tying its 
fate as a nation to a particular territory38. Whatever the tension that exists 
between the theory of federalism expounded by Madison and the theory of 
international relations of Hamilton, the theory of government appropriate 
for the new nation must rely on both. Its articulation can only take place at 
the point at which they intersect.  
2) A distrust of the organic runs through the work of both men. Hamil-
ton argues that « politicians have ever with great reason considered the ties 
of blood as feeble and precarious links of political connection39 ». If Madi-
son, for his part, is loath to involve the people in government, it is because 
he expects they will be moved by passions that have their seat in such natu-
ral ties or, more precisely, in the relationship of proximity they create. To 
Madison, it is the pre-eminence of proximity that condemns democracy – 
« a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and ad-
minister the government in person » – to fail as a system of government40. 
The pre-eminence of the personal entails the near-impossibility of curbing 
the passions that animate the people. This explains why Madison is so dis-
 
37 J.G.A. POCOCK, The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlan-
tic Republican Tradition, Princeton/Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 531; 
G. STOURZH, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government, Stanford, Stan-
ford University Press, 1970, p. 160-161. See also J. YARBROUGH, « Federalism in the 
Foundation and Preservation of the American Republic », Publius, 6, 3, 1976, p. 43-44.  
38 The demonstration that the American form of government is of a compound nature is 
thus prefaced with the observation that it, alone, is reconcilable with the « genius of the 
American people; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution » (The Federalist Pa-
pers, XXIX, p. 254 (Madison)). The force with which this association conditions thinking 
about the nature of American government is reflected in Patrick Henry’s observation that 
the transition from a confederacy to a consolidated government would be « a revolution as 
radical as that which separated us from Great Britain » (P. HENRY, Speech to the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention (June 5, 1788), in R. KETCHAM (dir.), The Anti-Federalist Papers and 
the Constitutional Convention Debates, London/New York, Penguin Books, 2003, p. 200. 
In order to pre-empt the move towards consolidation that the reference to revolution invites, 
Henry goes on to add that « [happily] for us, there is no real danger from Europe » (p. 204). 
39 The Federalist Papers, XXIV, p. 191 (Hamilton). 
40 See the analysis in P.S. ONUF, « James Madison’s Extended Republic », Texas Tech Law 
Review, 21, 1990, p. 2380. 
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trustful of the legislative branch. Unlike the other two branches whose 
members are few in number and little-known, its members « are distributed 
and dwell among the people at large, » with whom they have « connections 
of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance » which enable them to exer-
cise« a personal influence among the people41 ».  
Hamilton’s imperialism and Madison’s federalism both involve a 
movement away from the natural, organic foundations of social life. It is not 
clear what purpose it serves in imperialism but then we may be wrong to 
look for one. To Hamilton, denaturalization is simply of feature of interna-
tional relations. Evoking the possibility that Britain and Spain, the major 
maritime powers of Europe, might in the future become allied against the 
Union, he explains that this eventuality, which he considers to be all but in-
evitable, would be brought about by « the increasing remoteness of consan-
guinity [that] is every day diminishing the force of the family compact be-
tween France and Spain42 ». To which he adds that politicians have « ever 
with great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links 
of political connection ». 
Within the American polity, on the contrary, denaturalization serves a 
definite politico-constitutional purpose. Channeled through a federal system 
of government, it lays the foundations for the republic by containing the ef-
fects of public passion and the faction it gives rise to. It does so, primarily, 
by posing constitutional barriers to the circulation of sentiment:  
The influence of factious leader may kindle a flame within their particular 
States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the 
other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a 
part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire 
face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that 
source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal di-
vision of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be 
less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member 
of it, in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a par-
ticular country or district than an entire State. In the extent and proper 
structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the 
diseases most incident to republican government43. 
On Madison’s theory of government, the introduction of distance is 
quite literally a condition of republican rule. Given the impossibility of re-
moving the causes of faction, Madison looks to untie factious interests from 
local government, thereby creating the conditions of a higher form of fac-
tion more likely to serve the common good than local interests. Federalism 
is implicated in this operation in two ways: first, it diffuses constitutional 
authority between levels of governments, which has the effect of denatural-
izing personal ties of political association, and, secondly, it facilitates the 
extension of the republic. If we consider the work federalism does in this 
format of government, we find that it performs a function that, in European 
 
41 The Federalist Papers, XLIX, p. 315 (Madison). 
42 The Federalist Papers, XXIV, p. 191 (Hamilton). 
43 The Federalist Papers, X, p. 128 (Madison). 
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political jurisprudence, is tied to sovereignty: by elevating government 
above the realm of human passions and interests, federalism renders a plu-
rality of self-interested individuals capable of being governed as a republic. 
Sovereignty and federalism both operate by introducing an artificial element 
into the body politic on which its unity is to rest, whether in the form of the 
person of the sovereign or the purely « ideal » nation of the Union of which 
Tocqueville speaks44. And as it was in European political jurisprudence, de-
naturalization of the polity is an enabling condition of the refinement and 
enlargement of public views through representation that Madison expects 
his system of government to deliver.  
The partial reprise of sovereignty’s mode of operation refers back to the 
difference in the modality of denaturalization (automatic/engineered) within 
and outside the polity. Between nations, in the international state of nature, 
denaturalization happens automatically as there are no constraints on power. 
As it was in Hobbes’ theory of commonwealth, denaturalization is a func-
tion of power. Within the polity, denaturalization must be engineered by 
means of a federal system of government so as to preserve the precarious 
equilibrium between the parts of the Union. Given the threat of division 
among its « rival nations, » the question of the identity of the body politic – 
always also the question of sovereignty – must be kept suspended. The in-
tuition that informs the federalist papers is that the Union would not survive 
the determination of this question that would drive the people of America to 
take refuge « in the arms of monarchy, or [to split] ourselves into an infinity 
of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths45 ». 
On both scenarios – consolidation and fragmentation –, the Union 
would effectively become realigned on the Old World, the world of Europe-
an power politics. In settling the question of political identity, the people(s) 
of America would call into being a sovereign power, whether it would cover 
the entire territory of the young polity or only determinate parts of it. Seen 
in this perspective, the federalism we find in the federalist papers appears as 
a means to dissociate essential functions of the operation of a public law 
system, chief among them representation of the unity of the polity, from the 
format of sovereignty. One might say that the federalism of The Federalist 
Papers is a means of processing the political legacy of Europe. Its ultima 
ratio is to prevent the forces of disaggregation that originate in Europe from 
coming into direct contact with America’s virgin territory. The Union, Ham-
ilton and Madison believed, desperately lacked the means to defend itself 
 
44 A. TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America, I, I, 8, op. cit, p. 155-157: « The government 
of the Union rests almost wholly on legal fictions (fictions légales). The Union is an ideal 
nation that exists so to speak only in [the] minds [of its subjects], and whose extent and 
bounds intelligence alone discovers. The general theory being well understood, the difficul-
ties of application remain; they are innumerable, for the sovereignty of the Union is so en-
meshed in that of the states that it is impossible at first glance to perceive their limits. Eve-
rything is conventional and artificial in such a government, and it can be suitable only for a 
people long habituated to directing its affairs by itself, and in which political science has 
descended to the last ranks of society ». 
45 The Federalist Papers, IX, p. 120, (Hamilton); cf. V, p. 101-102 (Jay).  
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against these forces; in part, because the powers of the Old World continued 
to meddle in its affairs, hoping to render its rival nations « the instruments 
of foreign ambition, jealousy, and revenge, 46  » but also, and more im-
portantly, because the Union was ill-prepared to take on history. It found it-
self in the position of having to negotiate the present without having lived 
the history leading up to it, and thus without having at its disposal the tools 
to fend for itself. The sense of an almost ontological vulnerability that 
comes from being a late-comer in history is a key to understanding the polit-
ical theory of The Federalist Papers. Nowhere is this sense more clearly ex-
pressed than in Hamilton’s reflections on the war that would be sure to fol-
low, should the Union dissolve. In Europe, the history of war « is no longer 
a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and 
retaken, of battles that decide nothing, of retreats more beneficial than victo-
ries, of much effort and little acquisition ». In America, on the other hand, 
« the scene would be altogether reversed47 ». Here, the want of standing ar-
mies and fortifications that in Europe act as obstacles to invasion would 
both facilitate conquests and render more difficult the keeping of them. As a 
result, wars would be « desultory and predatory, » « accompanied with 
much greater distresses » than in Europe.  
IV. COMPARING TRAJECTORIES 
As we hope to have shown, comparing the trajectories of European and 
American federalism allows us to move beyond the sterile opposition of 
federalism and sovereignty we find in so much federalism theory. It allows 
us to bring out the way configurations of authority grow out of, and in turn 
inflect, the working itself out of a polity. What a specific form of federalism 
looks like depends on how elements of political jurisprudence are taken up 
as public law theory works to realize an ideal of what it is meant to do, tak-
ing into consideration what it can do, given the circumstances. Federalism, 
on this view, is essentially unfinished. Contrary to a view that the American 
Revolution, unlike the French, actually succeeded in founding the repub-
lic48, we have seen that the question of foundation is never laid to rest in the 
system of government proposed by Hamilton and Madison, which is pre-
cisely why they articulated it as a federal system. What set the political ju-
risprudence of the United States of America apart from the European origi-
nal may simply be that where the latter enacted its foundation on the thresh-
old of human life, the former was, for reasons of theory and history, in a po-
sition to clear that threshold.  
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